Global Banking after the GFC: Lessons for India by Mullineux, Andrew
1 
 
“Global Banking after the GFC: Lessons for India” 1 
Andy Mullineux  
(Professor of Financial Economics and Deputy Dean 
Research, Business School, Bournemouth University) 
 
 Abstract  
This paper is based on a keynote presentation at the 2nd Pan IIM 
World Management Conference hosted by the IIM in Kozhikode 
(IIMK) in November 2014.  It draws lessons from the ‘Global’ 
Financial Crisis for the governance, regulation and structural reform 
of banking, as well as monetary policy in a globalising financial 
system. Lessons are also drawn from the Eurozone Crisis, the Asian 
Financial Crisis and China. The focus then turns to lessons for India 
with regard to banking and economic growth, financial sector 
development, and addressing market failures in SME and 
infrastructural finance. It concludes that the appropriate extent of 
state ownership of banks and the process for reducing it, whilst also 
recapitalising banks, along with the development of capital markets, 
should be an integral part of India’s wider structural reform 
programme. 
 
             
 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on the keynote presentation by Andy Mullineux in the Plenary Session 2 (Day 2, 6th 
November, 2014, 09.30-11.00) ‘Theme Discussion’ on “Decoding Indian Business and Indian Markets” at the 
2nd Pan IIM World Management Conference hosted by the Indian Institute of Management in Kozhikode 
(IIMK), Kerala, India. 
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1) Lessons from the ‘Global’ Financial Crisis (GFC) 
The GFC was not truly, ‘Global’ but was ‘Great’ in magnitude, particularly so in 
the US, and the UK and the EU.  Emerging market economics were affected 
largely due to capital market aftershocks and the ‘Great Recession’ that 
followed the financial crisis, but their financial systems largely remained crisis 
free, as did those of Canada and Australia. 
The GFC itself marked a monumental failure of bank governance in the worst 
affected countries; particularly the US and the UK, but also Germany.  Banks 
were not adequately managing their risk exposures and external auditors did not 
seem to be alert to the problem. Further, shareholders and other stakeholders 
were not ensuring that bank risk management was properly governed and 
permitted remuneration systems that rewarded risk seeking behaviour and 
encouraged short term profit seeking by management to be put in place as they 
sought ever higher returns on equity, rather the assets.  Regulators and 
supervisors of banks bought into the idea that the financial system as a whole 
was being rendered stable because financial derivatives, including mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), were 
spreading not only exchange rate and  interest rate risks, but increasingly, also 
credit risks, more widely, or ‘diversifying’ them. Meanwhile, the shadow banking 
system that developed as part of the processes of securitisation and 
‘derivitisation’, along with increased reliance on wholesale money market 
financing from money market mutual funds (MMMFs) was largely unregulated.  
Additionally, bank leverage (debt liabilities in relation to equity capital) and 
funding gaps (loans less retail deposits) increased dramatically in decade prior 
to the crisis.  Shareholders were thus increasingly exposed to both liquidity and 
solvency crises, despite the evolution of the ‘Basel Committee’ (on Banking 
Supervision, BCBS) risk-related capital adequacy requirements from the first 
Basel Accord (‘Basel I’) in 1988 to ‘Basel II’ in 2004 and beyond.  Whilst Basel I  
concentrated on credit  risks and Basel II additionally required capital 
provisions for ‘market risks’, neither included liquid reserve requirements.  
Overall the focus was on regulating individual banks, using internal ‘Value at Risk’ 
(VaR) models and the opinions of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) for guidance in 
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the case of the bigger banks; rather than systemic risks.  Supervision was 
micro-prudential, rather than macro-prudential. 
 
Monetary policy was led by the US Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in an 
increasingly globalised financial system in which the US dollar remained the 
main reserve currency under the Chairmanships of Alan Greenspan and Ben 
Bernanke.  The FRB had responded to a series of negative financial ‘shocks’ in 
the capital markets, including the collapse of the ‘Dot-Com’ bubble and “9/11” 
(2001), by cutting interest rates.  Low short term interest rates led to a build-
up of household debt and seemingly perverse capital inflows into the US due to 
‘global imbalances’; which pushed down long term interest rates, making 
mortgage finance ever more attractive.  The ‘global imbalances’ were an echo of 
the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis and the build up by China, as well as Japan 
and the oil exporting ‘Gulf States’, of substantial dollar reserves; which were 
naturally invested in US Treasury Bonds and stocks.  ‘Cheap money’ sustained 
for long periods tends to stoke up asset price inflations as capital gains from 
holdings of various financial assets, real estate and commodities are sought 
because real interest rates and associated yields are abnormally suppressed. 
A key lesson from the GFC is that the regulation and supervision of banking 
systems and wider financial systems, including shadow banking, is now required.  
Given that the globalisation of finance, and thus international multinational 
banking, is now well established, substantial international supervisory co-
ordination will be required, as the Financial Stability Board, which was enhanced 
in the wake of the GFC, has acknowledged. Where the ‘resolution’ of failed 
banks with cross-border operation is required, the governments involved will 
have to take the unpopular measure of sharing losses at their taxpayers’ 
expense. Agreements will thus be politically contentious and ‘blame shifting’ can 
be expected; as in the past with the ‘Banco Ambrosiano affair’ and in the 
resolution of ABNAmro during the GFC. 
More generally, taxpayers should be protected from attempts by big banks and 
their shareholders and other stakeholders from ‘pocketing’ the gains in the 
good years whilst ‘socialising’ their losses in the bad ones.  That having been 
said, financial stability is a public good that taxpayers should, at least in part, 
pay for, especially as they enjoy the tax revenue from the profits and the high 
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salaries and bonuses generated in the good times, and also benefit from the 
jobs created by a growing and thriving banking sector when it  allocates capital 
efficiency. Hence, the appropriate taxation, regulation and supervision of banks 
is an important public policy issue (Chaudhry, Mullineux, and Agarwal 2014). 
 
 
It is now clear that (micro- and macro-) prudential regulation of the banks and 
the wider financial system and monetary policy must be co-ordinated and that, 
in a globalised financing system, this must be done both domestically and 
internationally.  Domestic balancing may be difficult to achieve with face of 
free international capital flows, unless the global imbalances are successfully 
reduced.  There was little evidence that major progress had been made in the 
post crisis period; although the recent apparent slowdown in Chinese growth and 
elimination of Japan’s trade surplus may help. 
Bank remuneration structures have remained stubbornly unreformed.  There has 
been a regulatory response in the EU; with the UK authorities trying to pick a 
path between voters’ distaste of ‘bankers’ bonuses’ and the desire to  maintain 
‘The City’s’ competitive edge, whilst also discouraging ‘excessive’ risk taking.  
Ultimately, bankers’ remuneration should be a corporate governance issue and it 
is disappointing that the Boards of Directors and shareholders of banks have 
not got to grips with it; despite government prompting, particularly in the UK, 
but also in the US. The concern about ‘short termism’ in banking induced by 
management remuneration packages also remains unresolved.   
In the US and the UK new regulatory authorities have been put in place (the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the US under the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK, which took over from the Financial Services 
Authority in April 2013) to protect its consumers against the miss-selling of 
financial products and services and inappropriate financial innovation. 
The UK’s FCA has become increasingly active; so much so that ‘The City’ is now 
lobbying politicians to restrain it!  ‘Over-regulation’ may, however, push some 
banking activity into the shadows and discourage potentially beneficial financial 
innovation, so an appropriate balance does need to be struck with a focus on 
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regulating banking activity, rather than banks per se.  Increased regulation also 
makes it more expensive to provide basic ‘utility’ banking services without the 
prospect of cross-selling the higher margin financial products and services 
increasingly sought by middle classes; especially in the context of ageing 
populations.  Access to basic banking services may thus be restricted, leading to 
financial exclusion. 
There is growing evidence of ‘de-leveraging’ in response to the tougher capital 
and liquidity requirements being imposed in the post crisis period.  It is too 
early to gauge whether this is transitory, as banks adjust to the new regime, or 
permanent; but it does seem to have resulted in restricted long term 
infrastructure lending and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) financing, 
or increased ‘credit rationing’, by banks.  These developments, especially with 
regard to SME financing, have been particularly problematic in the EU, including 
the UK; where capital markets are much less developed than in the US.  There is 
some evidence that internet-based debt and equity crowd-funding is beginning 
to fill the SME debt and equity funding groups, but credit rationing remains well 
above ‘normal’ levels. It should be noted that many countries, including the US, 
UK and Germany, try to curtail the ‘normal’ credit rationing, which results from 
information asymmetries, by offering state-backed loan guarantees to banks’ 
that lend to SMEs. 
 
The 2009-12 ‘Eurozone (debt) Crisis’ illustrated the risks associated with 
allowing a ‘Doom Loop’ to develop (Mullineux, 2014).  As EU banks deleveraged, 
they replaced loans on their balance sheets with government bonds. Then, as the 
crisis deepened, banks in the stronger ‘core’ countries reduced their holdings of 
bonds issued by the troubled periphery governments, and the banks in the 
periphery countries increased their holdings of bonds issued by their domestic 
governments; who were liable to bail them out.  The risk associated with holding 
‘periphery’ government bonds, and thus their premium over German ‘bunds’, 
increased. This in turn made it more difficult for the ‘periphery’ countries to 
finance their deficits.  The credit ratings of domestic banks and their 
governments thus became highly correlated, and both deteriorated in ‘the 
periphery’.  The implications for countries, such as India, with a high level of 
state ownership of banks, are clear.  Indian banks weathered the crisis well 
because the markets did not doubt that the Indian government would 
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underwrite the banks, as did banks in China for a similar reason, but will this 
always be the case? 
Another by-product of the crisis has been the questioning of the alleged 
benefits of the ‘universal banking’.  The model was well established in 
Continental Europe and developed in the UK after the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ financial 
sector reforms and in the US after the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act 
(which separated commercial banking form securities or investment banking 
business in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929) in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act in 1999.  Proponents of the model emphasise beneficial economics of scale 
and scope, but managerial diseconomies have become evident in the Citibank 
group and elsewhere. Further, the bigness and interconnectedness that results 
from the financial ‘conglomeratisation’ seems to have increased global systemic 
risks and rendered the ‘resolution’ of global universal banks particularly 
complex. 
The EU has consequently been considering structural reform of the banking 
sector (Liikanen, 2012) and the UK is in the process of implementing proposals 
emanating from the ‘Vickers Report’ (2011) and the report of the Parliamentary 
Committee and Banking Standards (PCBS, 2013), and has set in motion full 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) review of the retail banking sector. 
Barriers to new entry to the banking industry should be removed and diversity 
in banking should be encouraged by regulating retail banking as utility and 
requiring universal service provision; which in this case means access to basic 
payments and banking services, including credit.  Big banks and their 
shareholders should not be allowed to benefit from economic rents gained from 
oligopolistic market power.   
New entry can be promoted by ‘levelling the playing field’ with regard to deposit 
insurance. Big banks should be required to contribute to funded and state 
backed deposit guarantee schemes with risk-related premiums and coverage 
should immediately be extended to new entrants, as recently instituted in China. 
Big banks should not be allowed to gain a funding advantage form implicit state 
guarantees, ultimately at the taxpayers’ expense and guaranteed retail deposits 
should not be allowed to fund trading and wider investment banking activity. 
Ultimately, the increased capital requirements on investment banking activity 
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and the supplementary capital requirements being imposed on the ‘systemically 
important’ banks may induce the voluntary separation of retail and investment 
banking businesses. Regulating retail banking as a utility and requiring universal 
service provision, or access to finance, would similarly encourage separation 
from investment banking; which would require a higher return on equity to 
compensate for its higher risk exposures.  
Capital market development and increased internet based crowd funding may 
increasingly fill any financial gaps resulting from the necessary deleveraging of 
banking.  The US not only has the most highly developed capital markets, but 
also very well established regional and local community oriented banks; in good 
part due to the requirements of its Community Reinvestment Act, which was 
introduced in 1977 and enhance substantially in the mid-1990s, and subsequently 
further amended. 
 
As a result of ultimately decisive government intervention in the wake of the 
September 2008 Lehman Brothers failure, the US financial system recovered 
more quickly than the systems in the UK and the EU.   Consequently, SMEs in 
the US have been much less credit constrained because of the strong 
community banking sector, highly developed capital markets, an established 
venture capital sector, and a rapidly emerging crowd-funding capacity. 
 
 
2. Lessons from ‘Further-back’ and ‘Close-by’ 
The 1997/8 Asian Finance Crisis (AFC) illustrated the risks associated with 
over-reliance on foreign currency (largely USD) denominated capital and 
international borrowing from foreign banks; as opposed to domestic bond 
market financing. 
The post 1990 reform of the formerly centrally planned economies in Central 
and Eastern Europe involved the privatisation of both state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and state-owned banks (SOBs). In Poland the interconnectedness of the 
privatisation process was fully acknowledged. It was not possible to privatise 
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SOEs without resolving the problem of their indebtedness to SOBs, which was 
incurred under the central planning system, and yet if the debts were to be 
forgiven prior to SOE privatisation, the SOBs would be exposed to a growing 
‘bad debt’ problem because the SOEs were unable to service their debts at the 
new market (as opposed to planning) prices. Further banks were severely 
undercapitalised and had made no loan loss provisions. The problem was thus, 
how to privatise SOEs and SOBs whilst dealing with the bad debt problems and 
re-capitalising banks? 
More generally, past bank failures, such as the 1991 ‘BCCI affair’, have involved 
banks’ lending too much, relative to their bad loan provisions and capital, to a 
small group of borrowers.  The banks cannot let these borrowers default for 
fear of undermining their own solvency and so the large borrowers can dictate 
loan terms to their banks.  If representatives of the large corporate borrowers 
join the boards of the banks which lend to them, then their oligarchic power is 
increased.  Further, if they are allowed to set up their own banks then their 
depositors are likely to be seen as a cheap and stable source of long term 
capital, or ‘milch cows’. 
As in China, India’s partially privatised SOBs dominate the banking sector.  
India may not be Western, and it is certainly not the same as China, but there 
are lessons to be learnt from banking systems abroad, nevertheless. 
China’s state dominated banking system proved useful in mounting a monetary 
stimulus to complement the fiscal stimulus implemented by the government 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but the sector has suffered from 
recurring non-performing loan (NPL) problems and indeed is currently regarded 
by many analysts to be troubled by NPLs.  Capital hoarding by the SOB-SOE 
nexus in China also starves the SME sector of capital; inhibiting job creation, 
innovation and growth. 
3. Lessons for India 
3.1 Banks and Growth 
The banking and the wider financial sector contributes to growth by efficiently 
allocating capital and in so doing widens access to finance; thereby reducing 
financial exclusion and poverty. Further, the expansion of the financial service 
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sector will itself contribute to growth through job creation.  In the UK the 
growth of employment in the financial sector following the 1986 Big Bang 
liberalisation was dramatic. Better regulated, governed and managed banks are 
likely to allocate capital more efficiently, thereby promoting innovation and 
growth, and are themselves responsible for monitoring, and thus effectively the 
corporate governance of, the SMEs that borrow from them. 
The effectiveness of the corporate governance of shareholder-owned banks in 
the EU and US was called into question by the GFC, as we have already noted.  
However, problems also occurred with the governance of public sector banks, 
particularly the ‘Landesbanken’ in Germany, the local public savings banks 
(‘Casse’) in Spain following the GFC, and more recently, the Co-operative bank in 
the UK.  The central institution of the German co-operative banking system also 
got into difficulties.  Hence governance problems in banking are evident under 
shareholder, public and mutual ownership.  Different solutions are required for 
each, but nevertheless diversity of ownership models seems desirable because 
the better managed mutual banks did continue to provide retail banking services 
to households and SMEs in Germany and the US, and elsewhere.  There is a risk 
that the post-crisis regulatory reforms are focussing too much on resolving the 
governance problem in large shareholder-owned banks with the unintended 
consequences of reducing diversity by squeezing out ‘mutual banks’ and 
potentially reducing access to finance as a result. 
3.2 Modern Banking 
Advanced financial sectors increasingly rely on ‘big data’ as a fourth ‘factor of 
production’ alongside the traditional three; land, labour and capital. Indeed 
modern banking and finance is based as much, if not more, on information as it is 
on money creation.  What exactly is money, and indeed liquidity, has long been 
debated by financial economists and has clearly changed over time.  Money’s 
prime usefulness is in conveying information on credit worthiness and as a 
standard for valuing or pricing other products, and it is increasingly becoming 
digital. 
The winners will command the best information set, will potentially ‘take all’, or a 
large chunk of it!  Big banks have for some time looked like ‘dinosaurs’ (as they 
famously did to Bill Gates of Microsoft, circa 1994) awaiting extinction as they 
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struggle to keep their IT systems up to date; and indeed ‘fit for purpose’ in 
light of payments system failures in major UK retail banking operations in 
recent years. 
But are banks dinosaurs?  Mobile phone payment systems, such as the highly 
successful M-Pesa system in Kenya, and near-field technology has begun to eat 
the banks ‘lunch’ by reducing their domination of payment systems.  PayPal and 
other internet banking systems have also made incursions as internet shopping 
increases in popularity; as has Bitcoin, the digital currency. To survive the big 
banks will need to form alliances with mobile phone and internet network 
providers and/or mobile phone producers such as Apple; which concluded a 
significant deal with big US banks and credit card companies in September 
2014. 
We have noted that the big banks are also under attack from internet based 
crowd-funders and invoice discounters.  Some banks are responding by forming 
alliances with crowd-funders to help them to ‘up-scale’ by investing capital in 
them and facilitating the securitisation of the outstanding receivables on their 
loans.  Others are setting up their own internet-based crowd funding operations 
to complement their internet and mobile phone banking facilities 
The ‘net’ result (if you will excuse the pun!) will be increased competition and a 
consequent reduction in transaction costs for users; unless the big banks are 
allowed to re-assert their dominance of payments systems! 
3.3 Addressing Market Failures  
Infrastructural financing is naturally addressed through bond and longer term 
insurance and pension fund investment; but due to information asymmetry, 
there will remain a market failure on SME (both urban and rural or agricultural) 
lending for some time yet as capital markets and crowd funding seem unlikely to 
be able to overcome the problem of pricing credit risks accurately without 
better quality information, which can never be full information in a world of 
uncertainty. Hence, credit rationing of SMEs will persist and government 
intervention through targeted SME loan guarantees, as successfully used in the 
US through its Small Business Administration (SBA) and in Germany, through its 
development bank (KfW), will remain necessary. 
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Many countries have pressed banks to share information on good, as well as bad, 
credit risks in order to improve the quality of lending and increase the 
opportunities for households and SMEs to switch accounts between banks.  The 
requirement for banks to make provisions against possible future loan 
impairments will help encourage banks to assess and price credit risks more 
accurately. 
In most countries, SMEs face not only credit rationing, but also an equity 
finance gap.  Indeed more equity based finance and less debt would render them 
less likely to fail.  The venture capital industry is most highly developed in the 
US, but even there ‘seed corn’ and ‘early stage’ financing for SMEs has become 
progressively harder to access as venture funding has gravitated towards 
private equity funding of medium to large companies.  Lessons might however, be 
drawn from Islamic ‘profit and loss sharing’ financial contracts under which 
capital providers share in the downside, as well as the upside.  Under debt 
financing, interest has to be paid whether a profit or a loss is made, making 
SME failures more likely in recessions; especially if the state and larger 
companies increase late payments.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
India should consider whether substantial state ownership of banks is the best 
means of achieving an efficient allocation of capital and, if not, how should state 
ownership be reduced? 
The reduction of state ownership in the formerly centrally planned economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) led to substantial foreign ownership of banks. 
Without foreign capital injection, the necessary re-capitalisation of the large, 
partially state-owned, banks will weigh heavily on government finances.  Further, 
privatisation of the big banks, without breaking them into smaller units, risks 
creating on oligopolistic market structure in which economics rents can be 
extracted.  The alternative to rapid, and potentially costly, privatisation is to 
stimulate the growth of domestic ‘challenger’ banks, encourage foreign bank 
entry and to take steps to widen access to finance. 
In recent years, numerous reports have suggested various paths towards 
banking and wider financial sector reform in India and it seems that the current 
(Modi) government is preparing to act, with the support of Dr. Rajan, the 
12 
 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. Measures to broaden access to finance 
have already been instigated. 
Alongside the restructuring and recapitulation of the banking system, measures 
should to be taken to speed the development of capital markets in India.  As in 
the CEE countries, the ‘know-how’ imported through foreign bank entry is likely 
to prove invaluable; and partnerships, including ‘joint ventures’, between 
domestic and foreign financial institutions would accelerate the information and 
skills transfer process.  Also, as in the CEE countries, the commercialisation of 
partially state-owned banks may require a parallel reform of their domestic 
industrial conglomerate clients; which should be encouraged to issue corporate 
bonds and reduce reliance on bank financing. 
The Modi government is aiming to rebalance the Indian economy through a 
‘Made in India’ campaign, but what is the appropriate balance between the 
industrial and service sectors in a modern economy?  In the most advanced 
economies, the US, UK and in the EU, the service sector has progressively 
become by far the largest sector.  Attempts in the UK to rebalance its economy 
towards manufacturing, and to reduce reliance on the financial sector in the 
wake of the crisis, have had mixed success.  It is the largely service based 
Information Technology, or ‘IT’, sector that has thrived in London in recent 
years and the financial services sector now recovering strongly; whilst 
manufacturing resurgence is patchy. 
India already has a strong IT services and computer software sectors.  These 
will naturally facilitate the rapid development of internet and mobile phone 
banking; which is the banking technology of the future.  The ‘new’ technology can 
successfully promote households and SME access to the payments system and 
credit and other basic financial services without the need for costly to maintain 
bank branches, as long as the necessary education and access to the internet, in 
both rural and urban areas is assured. 
India already has the IT services and software know-how and thus the 
opportunity to take mobile banking and finance to a level well beyond the 
successful M-Pesa payments system in Kenya, if its mobile phone and internet 
providers can join forces with the banking system. 
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With the major banks ‘capital constrained’, some foreign bank and/or ‘C 
(communication) and IT’ firm participation, and foreign direct investment, would 
accelerate progress towards achieving access to digital finance ‘for all’  citizens 
and SMEs in India. 
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